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1. Introduction
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of financ-
ing to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their invest-
ment. Suppliers of financing in each country need to understand and de-
velop better corporate governance mechanisms so that they can secure their
return and achieve economic efficiency. Understanding corporate gover-
nance not only enlightens thediscussion of perhaps marginal improvements
in rich economies, but can also stimulate major institutional changes in
places where they need to be made (Shleifer – Vishny, 1997). Corporate go-
vernance is important for the above-mentioned reasons, even though some
people argue that product market competition takes care of corporate go-
vernance in terms of economic efficiency (Alchian, 1950), (Stigler, 1958).
Product market competition may reduce the returns on capital and hence
cut the amount that managers can possibly expropriate, but it does not pre-
vent managers from expropriating the competitive return after the capital
is sunk. The two most common approaches to corporate governance rely on
giving investors some power. The first approach is to give investors power
through legal protection from expropriation by managers. Protection of mi-
nority rights and legal prohibitions against managerial self-dealing are exam-
ples of such mechanisms. The second major approach is ownership by large
investors (concentrated ownership). Most corporate governance mecha-
nisms used in the world – including large share holdings, relationship bank-
ing, and even takeovers – can be viewed as examples of large investors ex-
ercising their power (La Porta – Lopez – Shleifer – Vishny, 2002).1 While
large investors still rely on thelegal system, they do not need as many rights
as small investors do to protect their interests (Shleifer – Vishny, 1997).
Previous literature shows that various measures of corporate governance
are constructed in the international context. For example, La Porta et al.
(1998) construct the anti-director rights index as the sum of the six rights
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1 I will hereinafter refer to them as LLSV.measuring how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders
against controlling shareholders in the corporate decision-making process
with the index ranging from 0 to 6. A higher score on this index indicates
greater respect for investor protection or better corporate governance. They
also construct an accounting-standards index by examining or rating com-
panies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items, sug-
gesting a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 90. These items fall
into seven categories: general information, income statements, balance
sheets, cash-flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special
items. A high score of accounting standards suggests higher accounting-re-
port quantity/quality or better corporate governance. LLSV (2002) construct
cash-flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders to see the ef-
fects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow owner-
ship by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms.
2. Literature Review
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) defined corporate transparency as
the availability of firm-specific information to those outside publicly traded
firms, and viewed as the joint output of multi-faceted systems whose com-
ponents collectively produce, gather, validate and disseminate information
to market participants. They factor analyze an extensive range of measures
capturing countries’ firm-specific information environments, isolating two
factors interpreted as financial and governance transparency. Most of their
transparency data is from International Accounting and Auditing Trends,
Center for Financial Analysis and Research, Inc. (IAAT).
Extending the argument of Jin and Myers (2006), this paper shows the re-
lationship among R-squared measure2, corporate governance and corporate
transparency. Jin and Myers (2006) argue that R2 can be interpreted as
themeasure of corporate transparency because it represents how much mar-
ket indices explain individual firm returns. So, some individual firm re-
turns are explained more by the firm-specific information if R2 is low and
vice versa. Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) show that R2 is high in emerging
markets which normally have low corporate transparency. Combining these
two arguments, this paper argues that R2 has a negative relationship to
corporate transparency and it is affected more by corporate transparency
variables than corporate governance variables. In other words, R2 should
be high when there is low corporate transparency, and it should be low when
there is high corporate transparency. We will explain further why R2 is af-
fected more by corporate transparency variables than corporate governance
variables.
Roll (1988) does a thorough study of R2 and gives some implications for
our study which guides this paper. Roll (1988) calculates R2 for the returns
of large stocks as explained by systematic economic influences, by the re-
turns on other stocks in the same industry, and by public firm-specific news
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2 R-squared measure is obtained from market model regression which will be explained further
in variable construction sections.events. Using daily and monthly U.S. stock return data, he shows that there
is little relation between explanatory power and either a firm’s size or its
industry. Explanatory power by systematic economic factors is not very dif-
ferent across size or industries. By looking at the change in return distri-
bution when public news events are excluded, he concludes that there 
exists private information or else unrelated to concrete information. Even
though he does not use international return data, the same rule can be ap-
plied to international stock return behavior. According to his argument, sys-
tematic and firm-specific factors matter in R2. If we assume the systematic
factor as market indices in the market model regression, the paper is sup-
portive of our interpreting the magnitude of R2 as either higher or lower
firm-specific information. Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) show that stock prices
move together more in poor economies than in rich economies. Using two
stock-price synchronicity measures, the paper attempts to find the reason
for this phenomenon. One measure is to calculate the fraction of stocks that
move in the same direction in each country, and the other measure is to cal-
culate the R2s of regressions using the market-model-type regression equa-
tion. In this regression equation, they run the regression of individual firm
stock returns of each country on the local market return of each country,
US market return and the foreign-exchange rate. They consider stock co-
-movement variables, structural variables and institutional variables as ex-
planatory variables. They find that market size does not explain this phe-
nomenon and that higher fundamentals correlation in low-income econo-
mies partially explain this phenomenon. They also find that measures of
property rights explain the phenomenon. The systematic component of re-
turns variation is large in emerging markets, and appears unrelated to
fundamentals co-movement, consistent with noise trader risk. Among de-
veloped-economy stock markets, higher firm-specific returns variation is as-
sociated with stronger public investor property rights. They propose that
strong property rights promote informed arbitrage, which capitalizes de-
tailed firm-specific information. Even though they find higher firm-specific
returns variation, which can be interpreted as lower R2, is associated with
stronger public investor property rights, they cannot explain why this hap-
pens. This is because they cannot find the characteristic of R2 itself. They
simply define R2 as the stock-price synchronicity or stock-return syn-
chronicity. Jin and Myers (2006) extend Morck, Yeung and Yu’s (2000) pa-
per by making clear the characteristic of the R2 measure. They argue that
poor protection without opaqueness, which is the opposite of transparency,
is not enough to explain high R2. This is different from the view that opaque-
ness and imperfect protection of investors’ property rights go together and
probably are mutually reinforcing. Assuming the firm is not completely
transparent, outside investors can observe all market-wide information, but
only part of firm-specific information. Let’s say poor protection of investors’
property rights allows insiders to capture half of the firm’s cash flows on
average, but they capture more when the hidden firm-specific information
is positive and less when it is negative. Opaqueness therefore requires in-
siders to absorb some firm-specific variance. The firm-specific variance ab-
sorbed by investors is correspondingly lower. Of course investors absorb all
market risk (macroeconomic information is presumably common know-
ledge). Thus the ratio of market to total risk is increased by opaqueness.
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Furthermore, suppose that investors could enforce their property rights
fully and without cost whenever they receive information about cash flows
or firm value. They obtain every dollar of cash flow or value that is appa-
rent to them. Nevertheless, if the firm is not completely transparent, in-
siders can still capture unexpected cash flows that are not perceived by in-
vestors. They will absorb some firm-specific risk. Again, the more opaque
the firm, the higher its R-squared measure.3 They test the hypothesis that
lack of transparency shifts firm-specific risk to insiders and it reduces
the amount of firm-specific risk absorbed by outsider investors. Using stock
returns from 40 stock markets from 1990 to 2001, they find strong positive
relations between R2and several measures of opaqueness. Even though they
use good government index as the measure of the protection of property
rights and five opaqueness measures, there are other measures of the pro-
tection of property rights such as anti-director rights (LLSV, 1998). Also,
many corporate governance variables can be theindirect measure of thepro-
tection of property rights.
3. Hypothesis
Supporting the argument of Jin and Myers (2006), this paper tries to ex-
tend their argument to corporate governance versus corporate transparency.
Using the corporate governance indices from LLSV (1998) and corporate
transparency indices from Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004), the pa-
per attempts to see whether R2 has a negative relationship to corporate
transparency variables and whether or not it is more affected by corporate
transparency variables than corporate governance variables after controll-
ing for macroeconomic variables. If Jin and Myers (2006) are correct and
R2 is affected by corporate transparency, then there should be a negative
relationship between R2 and corporate transparency variables. Also, R2 is
affected more by corporate transparency variables than corporate gover-
nance variables or the effect of corporate governance variables on R2 will
disappear after corporate transparency variables are included in the re-
gression analysis. This will enhance the argument of Jin and Myers (2006)
and help the better understanding of the characteristic of R2 in the corpo-
rate governance context.
In summary, the paper tests the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis: R2 has a negative relationship to corporate transparency
variables and it is affected more by corporate trans-
parency variables than corporate governance variables
after controlling for macroeconomic variables.
The major contribution of this paper is that it introduces both corporate
transparency and corporate governance variables to explain the relation-
ship among R2, corporate transparency and corporate governance. Jin and
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3 See Jin and Myers (2006) for detailed information about this argument and mathematical
proofs.Myers (2006) use some corporate opaqueness measures, but the measures
they use are not much different from the corporate governance measures
in LLSV (1998) or LLSV (2002). Also, LLSV (2002) focuses on the legal pro-
tection of minority shareholders, and does not consider corporate trans-
parency itself, to explain the valuation of the firm. On the other hand, this
paper introduces corporate transparency measures from Bushman, Piot-
roski and Smith (2004) and investigates the relationship among R2, corpo-
rate governance and corporate transparency and their relative effect on R2,
which are not explored in either Jin and Myers (2006), LLSV (1998) or LLSV
(2002).
The rest of the paper consists of the following: First, data and variable
construction is introduced in Section 2. Second, regression analysis is in-
troduced in Section 3. The conclusion and further research are introduced
in Section 4. 
4. Data and the Construction of Variables
The main sources of data in this paper are Datastream, corporate gover-
nance variables from LLSV (1998) and corporate transparency variables
from Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004). The R2 variable is constructed
from Datastream.
4.1 R2
We first start with the list of 50 countries covered by Datastream Inter-
national for which common stock-return data, local market-return data, US
market-return data and therate of change in theexchange rate per U.S.dol-
lar are available. The sample period is from 1990 to 2004. We run the fol-
lowing regression which is the same as the regression equation in Morck,
Yeung and Yu (2000) to get R2:
rit =  i +  1,irm,jt +  2,i[rUS,t + ejt] +  it (1)
where i is a firm index, j a country market index, t an annual time index,
rm,jt a domestic market index, and rUS,t the U.S. market return. The rate of
change in the exchange rate per U.S. dollar is ejt.
U.S. stock-market return is included because most economies are at least
partially open to foreign capital. The expression rUS,t +  ejt translates
U.S. stock-market returns into local currency units. Non-overlapping, an-
nually-compounded returns from daily total returns are used in this paper
instead of bi-weekly returns in Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) because all
the independent and controlling variables to match the dependent variable
are annual and thin-trading problems, which arise when securities are
traded infrequently, can be resolved. For stock markets which are in dif-
ferent time zones, such as the South Korean versus the U.S., a one-day lag
is given to U.S. market returns to resolve the time-difference problem. Also,
when U.S. data are used in the equation (1),  2,i is set to zero.
The total cross section for the sample period contains 24,989 firms span-
ning 40 countries. Stocks traded on fewer than 200 trading days are omit-
538 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 2006, ã. 11-12ted and the R2 out of 5 % of the critical value are dropped on the assump-
tion that coding errors are overrepresented in extreme observations.4There-
gression statistic for equation (1), R2
ij, measures the percent of the varia-
tion in the annual returns of stock i in country j explained by variations in
country j‘s market return and the U.S. market return. After trimming
the data, the total cross section of the sample period contains 19,566 firms
spanning 40 countries. Since the paper uses the same method of calculat-
ing R2
ij as Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), the same standard econometric re-
medy is used to cure the problem of R2
ij
5 as dependent variables. Logistic
transformations are applied to R2
ij as the following equation.
R2
ij Lij = log ––––––  (2)
1 – R2
ij
In this way, Lij maps R2
ij from the unit interval to   (the set of real numbers).
4.2 Corporate Governance and Corporate Transparency Variables
Corporate governance variables are obtained from LLSV (1998). They con-
structed different types of corporate governance variables from various
sources and categorized them into different groups, such as legal rules,
shareholder rights, creditor rights and legal enforcement. Among these vari-
ables which have the variation of the score for each country, three variables
are selected which have the least correlation with the corporate trans-
parency variables of Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004).6 These are anti-
-director rights and accounting standards. LLSV (1998) categorize ac-
counting standards as the legal enforcement group and anti-director rights
as the shareholder rights group. Accounting standards comprise the index
created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their
inclusion or omission of 90 items. This index is from International Ac-
counting and Auditing trends, Center for International Financial Analysis
and Research. These items fall into 7 categories (general information, in-
come statements, balance sheets, cash-flow statement, accounting stan-
dards, stock data, and special items). Aminimum of three companies in each
country were studied. The companies represent a cross section of various
industry groups. Industrial companies represented 70 %, and financial com-
panies represented the remaining 30 %. The anti-director rights comprise
the index aggregating the shareholder rights LLSV (1998) labeled as “anti-
-director rights”. This index is based on corporate law or the commercial
code. The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the company allows share-
holders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are not re-
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4 Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) define extreme values of return as greater than 0.25, but the pa-
per uses 5 % of the critical value of R2 because of the sample period difference.
5 Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) point out the problem of R
2
ij as a dependent variable in regres-
sions, which is that they are bounded within the intervals [0,1].
6 We selected the ones with less than 50 % of correlation with corporate transparency variables
of Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) because of the multicollinearity problem in the re-
gression analysis.quired to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting;
(3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in
the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed-minorities mechanism is
in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a share-
holder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or
equal to ten percent (the sample median); (6) shareholders have preemp-
tive rights that can be waived only by a shareholder’s vote. The index ranges
from zero to six.
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) construct corporate transparency
variables from various sources. They categorize corporate transparency
variables into three groups. These are the corporate reporting environment,
private information acquisition and dissemination of information. Two cor-
porate transparency variables are selected which have low correlation with
corporate governance variables and whose scores are varied. These are mea-
sure and nanalyst. Measure is from the corporate reporting environment
group and nanalyst is from the private information acquisition group. Mea-
sure is a rough attempt to capture cross-country differences in the ac-
counting principles used. Using the International Accounting and Auditing
Trends, Center for Financial Analysis and Research, Inc. (IAAT) database,
measure captures the extent to which 1. financial statements reflect sub-
sidiaries on a consolidated basis, and 2. general reserves are used. Because
consolidated financial statements generally are viewed as more informa-
tive, and theuse of general reserves is viewed as away to obscure afirm’spe-
riodic performance, they assign higher values of measure to firms that con-
solidate financial statements and do not use general reserves. They expect
higher values of measure to be associated with more informative financial
statements or higher transparency. Measure is the average percentile rank
within the sample of countries across these two categories. Nanalyst is
the number of analysts following the largest 30 companies in each country
in 1996. It is based on Chang, Khanna and Palepu (2000). Relations be-
tween public information disclosure and the private information process-
ing and gathering activities of investors have long been recognized as im-
portant determinants of information allocations in an economy (e.g.,
Verrecchia (1982)). This number of analysts is that of financial analysts who
specialize in processing and interpreting financial information reported by
firms, and in collecting additional information through discussion with
firms’ managers, suppliers, customers, etc. They expect higher values of
Nanalyst to be associated with higher transparency. China and Poland are
excluded because these countries do not have the above-mentioned data.
After trimming the data, the total cross section of the sample period con-
tains 19,107 firms spanning 38 countries.
4.3 Controlling Variables for Regression Analysis
In Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006), control vari-
ables are used for the regression analysis of R2 on corporate governance and
corporate transparency variables. These are the log of the number of stocks
traded in each country and the year, the log of country size (geographical
area in square kilometers), the variance of the growth rate of each coun-
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per capita GDP and Herfindahl indices calculated from the distribution of
sales of individual firms or industries within each country and year. From
these controlling variables, this paper uses the log of country size (geo-
graphical area in square kilometers), the variance of the growth rate of each
country’s GDP in real U.S. dollars based on 1990 U.S. dollars from 1990 to
2004 and the log of real per capita GDP in real U.S. dollars based on 1990
U.S. dollars from 1990 to 2004. Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) use the vari-
ance of per capita GDP growth for each country as the measure of macro-
economic instability. They also point out the importance of country size in
two ways. First, economic activity in a small country could be geographi-
cally localized, so that nearby geopolitical instability or localized environ-
mental catastrophes such as an earthquake or monsoons might have mar-
ket-wide effects that would not be as evident in a larger country. Second,
Bernstein and Weinstein (1998) observe the economic specialization pre-
dicted by standard international trade theory across geographical units of
similar size, but not across countries. This finding is consistent with larger
countries having factor endowments that exhibit less uniformity, and this
relation in turn suggests that the stocks of firms in large countries might
move more independently than those in small countries. Herfindahl indices
and the number of stocks for each year and country are excluded because
of the availability of firm-level accounting data and stock-market data for
each country and year. Country size data is from the CIA World Factbook
2000. GDPdata is from the international macroeconomic dataset of the Eco-
nomic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture. Another
controlling variable is introduced in this paper. It is the skewness of indi-
vidual stocks’R2s. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the individual stocks’
logistic transformation of R2 (logistic (R2)). Y-axis is the number of obser-
vation for each value of logistic (R2). X-axis is the value range of the indi-
vidual stocks’ logistic (R2). The distribution is slightly right-skewed. Be-
cause of this characteristic of the distribution of R2, skewness is calculated
and included in the controlling variables of the regression. It is hard to de-
cide whether the distribution has a fat tail, so kurtosis is not included in
the controlling variables of the regression. Also, there is a strong positive
correlation between skewness and kurtosis (above 90 %). The following for-






t=1 skewnessj = –––––––––––– (3)
(N – 1) * S3
skewnessj is the skewness of the individual stocks’ R2 for country j. R2
ij is
the R2 of the stock i for each year for country j. R
–
2 is the mean of the indi-
vidual stocks’R2 for country j. N is the number of observation of R2 for coun-
try j. S is the standard deviation of the individual stocks’ R2 for country j.
As shown in Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), the skewness in the stock-
-return distribution is a risk factor in the asset-pricing model if the stock
return distribution does not follow normal distribution. Bae, Lim and Wei
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the skewness characteristic of stock return. They find that stock returns in
economies characterized by poor corporate governance are likely to be more
positively skewed. Furthermore, stock returns of firms with poor gover-
nance within a country are also likely to be more positively skewed. Since
R2 is calculated based on the market model regression, its distribution also
shows the characteristic of stock-return distribution. Furthermore, its dis-
tribution may have the relationship with corporate governance based on
the results of Bae, Lim and Wei (2005). Since we use the country-level cor-
porate governance, corporate transparency and controlling variables, we
calculate the country-level skewness of R2 to see its effect on individual
firms’ R2 so that we can have consistent country-level effects of indepen-
dent variables on the individual firms’ R2.
In Figure 1, it can be also argued that logistic (R2) follows bi-modal dis-
tribution. We calculate summary statistics by dividing the sample into two
sub-samples based on the changing point of logistic (R2) value, which is
–3.18, in Figure 1. The summary statistics shows that there is no signifi-
cant difference between two sub-samples in terms of corporate governance,
corporate transparency and controlling variables, except for the measure
variable. The mean value of measure of the sub-sample with logistic (R2)
less than –3.18 is 65.64, while that of the sub-sample with logistic (R2)
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FIGURE 1 The Distribution of Cross-Country Logistic (R2)














Notes: This is the distribution of cross-country logistic transformation of R2, which is the dependent variable of the re-
gression analysis. The sample period is from 1990 to 2004. There are 38 countries in the sample. X-axis is
the logistic (R2) value ranging from around –9.18 to around –0.66 value. Y-axis is the frequency of the R2 value
ranging from around 300 to around 2,200. The distribution is slightly skewed to the right and shows the form
of bimodal distribution.greater than –3.18 is 57.47. It is consistent with Jin and Myers (2006) that
firms with high corporate transparency countries have low R2. However,
the result is not enough to show the distinct relationship among R2, corpo-
rate governance and corporate transparency.
The total firm-year observation in the regression analysis of Table 3 and
Table 4 is reduced to 91,332. This is because some countries do not have
the complete set of corporate governance and corporate transparency vari-
ables even though they have the complete set of controlling variables. In
other words, some countries have corporate governance variables while they
do not have one of the corporate transparency variables. Furthermore,
the per capita GDP data is not available for some countries and specific
years, especially for the year 2004. Since the regression analysis is based
on the complete set of corporate governance, corporate transparency and
controlling variables, it only has 91,332 firm year observations in the re-
gression. So, the number of countries covered in the regression is not ex-
actly 38, but we use the same number of countries to be consistent with
the number in the summary statistics.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of R2, corporate governance, cor-
porate transparency and controlling variables for the total sample. Mean
R2 is 0.0495. This mean is quite different from the mean R2 of Morck, Ye-
ung and Yu (2000) or Jin and Myers (2006) because the paper uses a longer
sample period, annual compounding returns and a different way of remov-
ing extreme values. However, the longer sample period should not have
a major effect on different mean R2 in comparison with that of Jin and 
Myers (2006) or Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), especially Jin and Myers
(2006), because Jin and Myers (2006) also use a long sample period from
1990 to 2001. We attribute the main reason of the difference to the way of
calculating compounded returns and removing extreme values. Both Morck,
Yeung and Yu (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) use either weekly or bi-
weekly compounded returns instead of annually compounded returns.
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) remove R2s greater than 0.25 instead of re-
moving R2sbeyond five percent critical values of thedistribution of R2. Since
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) only use the year 1995, they set the extreme
values of R2 according to their sample. However, we think the method of re-
moving extreme values in this paper is a more general way.
The summary statistics of logistic transformation of R2 are also intro-
duced and it is used as the dependent variable in the regression. Variables
are scale-adjusted before performing the regression analysis. Univariate
analyses are performed and not reported for the difference among the cor-
porate governance and corporate transparency variables that are selected.
All the differences among these variables are statistically significant within
the one-percent significance level.
In the regression analysis of Table 3 and Table 4, we adjusted the scale
of some variables based on the method used in Jin and Myers (2006). Jin
and Myers (2006) adjusted the scale of corporate governance variables, log
(per capita GDP) and log (country size) by dividing them by either 1,000 or
10,000 instead of dividing them by standard deviation. In Table 3 and
Table 4, (x10–3) and (x10–4) means divide the variable by 1,000 and 10,000,
respectively.
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finitions of all the variables below are the same as those in Table 1. Most
of the corporate governance and corporate transparency variables have less
than fifty-percent positive correlation and are statistically significant within
the one-percent significance level. The correlation between the anti-direc-
tor and accounting standards is slightly above fifty percent and positive.
Most of the controlling variables have less than fifty-percent correlation.
Half of them have negative correlation with other variables while others
have positive correlation. The correlation between log of per capita GDP
and measure, between log of per capita GDP and log of country size and be-
tween variance of per capita GDP growth rate and log of per capita GDP is
–0.5286, 0.5356 and –0.5053, respectively.
5. Regression Analysis
Table 3 provides the cross-sectional regression of individual stocks’ an-
nual average R2s across countries. The regression equation is as follows.
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TABLE 1 Summary Statistics
Variables MIN MAX MEAN STD
Dependent Variable (Individual Stocks’ Average R2)
R2 0.0001 0.3340  0.0495 0.0787
logistic transformation of R2 –9.2099 –0.6633  –4.5093  2.1045
Corporate Governance Variables
accounting standard 36.0000  83.0000  68.5093  6.8842
antidirector 0.0000 5.0000 3.8123  1.1467
Corporate Transparency Variables
measure 22.8300 100.0000  63.2025  27.0483
nanalyst 3.1900 32.4000  17.5277 6.4031
Controlling Variables
log(country size) 6.4731  16.1157  12.8557  2.2008
log(per capita GDP) 10.6325  15.9533  13.5403  1.3127
variance(growth rate of per capita GDP) 0.0001  0.0032  0.0006  0.0007
skewness 0.8772 9.2011 2.5403 1.8195
Notes: R2s for individual stocks are averaged for each year. The sample period is from 1990 to 2004, spanning
38countries. Summary statistics are calculated from thecross-sectional distribution of these individual stocks’
averages. Corporate governance variables are obtained from LLSV (1998) and IMD. Anti-director rights and
accounting standards are from LLSV (1998). Accounting standards comprise the index created by examining
and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items. This index is from In-
ternational Accounting and Auditing Trends, Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. Anti-
director rights comprise the index aggregating the shareholder rights LLSV (1998) labeled as “anti-director
rights”. Higher accounting standards and stronger anti-director rights mean better corporate governance.
Measure and nanalyst are from Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004). Measure is a rough attempt to cap-
ture cross-country differences in the accounting principles used. It is from the International Accounting and
Auditing Trends, Center for Financial Analysis and Research, Inc. (IAAT) database. Nanalyst is the number of
analysts following the largest 30 companies in each country in 1996. It is from Chang, Khanna and Palepu
(2000). Higher values of nanalyst are associated with higher transparency. Higher values of measure are as-
sociated with higher transparency. Country size data is from the CIA World Factbook 2000. GDP data is from
the international macroeconomic dataset of the Economic Research Service, United States Department of
Agriculture. Skewness is the third moment of the individual stocks’ R2s.logistic(R2)i,j,t =   +  1measurej,t +  2nanalystj,t +  3antidirectorj,t +
+  4accountingstandardj,t +  5 log(countrysize)j,t +  6 log(percapitaGDP)j,t +
+  7Variance(GDPgrowthrate)j,t +  8 skewnessj,t (4)
i, j and t represents stock ID, country ID and year ID, respectively.   is
the intercept of the regression. logistic(R2) is the logistic transformation of
individual stocks’ annual average across each country. measure is the mea-
sure variable.  nanalyst is the nanalyst variable.  accountingstandard  is
the accounting standard variable. antidirector is the anti-director variable.
log(countrysize) is the log of country size variable. log(percapitaGDP) is
thelog of real per capita GDPvariable.Variance(GDPgrowthrate) is thevari-
ance of real per capita GDP growth rate. skewness is the skewness of the in-
dividual stocks’ R2s for each country. The regression is adjusted for he-
teroskedasticity. The feasible Generalized Least Squares method is used to
adjust for heteroskedasticity, following Park (1966). A feasible GLS proce-
dure to correct for heteroskedasticity is performed as follows: First, run
the OLS regression using the above regression equation and save the resi-
duals. Second, create a new residual variable by first squaring the OLS
residuals and then taking the natural log. Third, run the regression of this
new variable on thesame set of regressors and save thefitted values. Fourth,
take exponential for the fitted values. Finally, estimate the original equa-
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TABLE 2 Correlation
Accoun- Antidi- Measure nanalyst log log Variance Skewness
ting rector (country (per (GDP 






Measure 0.4675 0.3075 1
(<.0001) (<.0001)
nanalyst 0.4635 0.3531 0.1618 1
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
log 0.1019 0.3035 -0.1638 0.1164 1
(country size) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
log -0.0968 0.3483 -0.5286 0.2968 0.5356 1
(per capita GDP) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Variance -0.0385 -0.2989 0.1105 -0.2330 -0.2907 -0.5053 1
(GDP growth rate) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Skewness -0.0580 0.0164 0.0445 -0.1119 0.1321 -0.1809 0.1900 1
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Notes: The Pearson correlation matrix is shown below. Definitions of all the variables below are the same as those
in Table 1. Most of the corporate governance and corporate transparency variables have less than fifty-per-
cent positive correlation and are statistically significant within the one-percent significance level. The corre-
lation between anti-director and accounting standard is slightly above fifty percent and positive. Most of
the controlling variables have less than fifty-percent correlation. Half of them have negative correlation with
other variables while others have positive correlation. The correlation between log of per capita GDP and
measure, between log of per capita GDP and log of country size and between variance of per capita GDP


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.tion by weighted least squares using weights of one over exponential of fitt-
ed values. The regression adjusted for serial correlation is also performed
but not reported. Maximum likelihood estimation method is used for serial
correlation adjustment, and the result is not statistically different from
the original regression.
All the corporate governance and transparency variables have a negative
relationship to R2 when you see regressions (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5). In re-
gression (3), the effect of the measure variable on R2 becomes negative but
statistically insignificant. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) categorize
nanalyst as the private information acquisition group and measure as
the corporate reporting environment group. According to the result of re-
gression (3), the private information acquisition characteristic of corporate
transparency affects R2 more than the corporate reporting environment
characteristic of corporate transparency. In regression (6), the effect of
the anti-director variable on R2 becomes positive while that of each corpo-
rate transparency variable is still negative. In regression (7), the effect of
the accounting standard variable on R2 becomes positive. This is not con-
sistent with the result of Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) that good corporate
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TABLE 4 Standardized Coefficient Estimates of the Regressions in Table 3
Dependent Variable:
logistic (R-squared) R2(1) R2(2) R2(3) R2(4) R2(5) R2(6) R2(7) R2(8)
Independent 
variables
Measure(x10–4) –0.06611 –0.00184 –0.01257 –0.01436 –0.01523
nanalyst(x10–4) –0.15933 –0.15850 –0.16173 –0.17554 –0.17659
Antidirector(x10–3) –0.03296 0.01738 0.00223
Accounting standard
(x10–4) –0.05387 0.03697 0.03604
log(country size) 
(x10–3) –0.09865 –0.12157 –0.12096 –0.10929 –0.09908 –0.12230 –0.12645 –0.12675
log(per capita GDP) 
(x10–4) 0.06486 0.15664 0.15603 0.11565 0.09110 0.14698 0.16256 0.16212
Variance (GDP 
growth rate) –0.08429 –0.08448 –0.08326 –0.09193 –0.07923 –0.08159 –0.08151 –0.08095
Skewness –0.27693 –0.30572 –0.30562 –0.26094 –0.27749 –0.30947 –0.30411 –0.30507
Notes: The sample period is from 1990 to 2004, spanning 38 countries. The variable description is the same as that
of Table 3. The regression is adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The regression adjusted for serial correlation is
also performed but not reported. The maximum likelihood estimation method is used for serial correlation
adjustment, and the result is not statistically different from the original regression. The standardized coeffi-
cients are the estimates that would be obtained if all the variables in the model were standardized to zero
mean and unit variance prior to performing the regression computations. Each coefficient indicates the num-
ber of standard deviation changes in the dependent variable associated with the standard deviation change
in the independent variable, holding constant all other variables. In other words, the magnitudes of the stan-
dardized coefficients are not affected by the scales of measurement of the various model variables and thus
may be useful in ascertaining the relative importance of the effects of the independent variables. By using
the standardized coefficient estimates, we can clearly see whether or not transparency variables have more
effect on R2 than governance variables. The Wald test is performed for the robustness check and the result
is not statistically different from the standardized coefficient estimates, and are thus not reported.